Global Trade Watch’s
Letter to HSUS’ Humane
Society International
The following letter from Lori Wallach, Director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch,
to Patricia Forkan, President of Humane Society
International has been circulating among environmental groups and environmental
email lists.
Patricia Forkan
President
Humane Society International
By Fax and Email
May 12, 2005
Dear Patti,
I wish we would have had an opportunity to talk before your appearance before
the Senate Finance Committee concerning the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) because on my agenda was a discussion of some of CAFTAs implications, if it were adopted, for wildlife
habitats, fisheries and marine mammals, Multilateral Environmental Agreements,
factory farming and other issues of special concern to the Humane Society.
After the hearing, I read your testimony very carefully. Could you clarify - is
Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) or Humane Society International
(HSI) supporting CAFTA and urging Congress to pass it? You did not state that,
although one could certainly come away with that impression given the positive
comments you made about CAFTAs environmental chapter.
That HSUS or HSI would support CAFTA seems improbable, given your organization
was one of those with the foresight to oppose the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s. CAFTA would extend the same problematic
provisions found in NAFTA to six additional nations regarding foreign investor
challenges to domestic environmental, land use and other policies. Like NAFTA, CAFTAs service sector rules would eliminate countries
abilities to halt certain environmentally damaging development, for instance
beach front hotels in sensitive habitats.
Meanwhile, CAFTAs environmental chapter is a shorter
version of NAFTAs environmental side agreement, but CAFTAs chapter omits some of the NAFTA commitments and
contains a yet more attenuated standard regarding environmental enforcement
than even used in the NAFTA environmental side agreement. (Your testimony has
an error in this regard, as it cites the NAFTA standard of review rather than
that in CAFTA.) The enforcement mechanism for this weak standard is the same as
in NAFTAs side agreement, except the fine level is
lower.
Plus, CAFTA does not include NAFTAs Article 104
savings clause which, with limits, was designed to give precedence to certain
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs),
including CITES, to the extent that these environmental treaties provisions
conflicted with NAFTAs commercial obligations. CAFTA
does include a surrender of CAFTA target nations ocean Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZ) and thus the rights to limit fishing, with the exception that the United States made a full reservation protecting
its EEZ and Costa Rica
seems to have tried to do so. Given NAFTAs eleven
year record, including the failure of the many attempts to use NAFTAs environmental side agreement to actually improve
environmental conditions, none of the environmental groups who supported NAFTA now
support CAFTA NAFTA expansion.
Regarding the environmental chapter, as I describe below, I disagree with the
analysis your testimony presented regarding its operation and value. More
broadly, your testimony failed to cover in any way aspects of CAFTA that would
seem of special relevance to HSUS and HSIs interests.
But most generally, what struck me strongly is that in your testimony you
merged together your enthusiastic comments about HSI work in Central
America and positive comments about the CAFTA itself.
Whatever good work HSI is doing in Central America
or anywhere else in the world is quite a different matter than the potential
implications of binding legal provisions of a proposed trade agreement. The
implications of the CAFTAs terms must be judged on
their own merits separately from the value of the work you are doing in the
region, even if it is work that was undertaken in the context of capacity
building in expectation of new prospective trade relations. While we also work
with people in the governments and civil societies of the CAFTA target
countries who are seeking to improve the environmental aspirations and work of
such people is altogether a different matter than the implications of CAFTAs provisions for the environment or animal welfare or
policies in Central America seeking to further those
goals.
Before moving to the serious threats to countries ability to maintain much less
improve their domestic environmental and animal protection policies that
provisions unique to CAFTA pose, I bring your attention to the GATT provisions
that the Humane Society is all too familiar with that have been included in the
CAFTA text.
CAFTA Incorporates GATT/WTO Rules Used
to Successfully Challenge Animal Protection Laws
CAFTA literally includes the very provisions of the GATT that were the basis
for the successful 1991 GATT challenge of the Marine Mammal Protection Act and
the successful 1998 WTO challenge of the sea turtle regulations of the
Endangered Species Act. Indeed, the CAFTA text explicitly incorporates WTO-GATT
Article III and its terrible jurisprudence against animal protection laws right
into the official legal CAFTA text. CAFTA also includes the
WTO-GATT Article XX exceptions for human, plant and animal health and life that
is written in a manner that has proved it repeatedly
to be useless in protecting U.S.
laws from successful trade challenge.
It was in the context of the work raising public awareness of these cases tuna
-dolphin and shrimp-turtle and fighting to stop the weakening changes to U.S. law they
required that my work relationship with HSUS was built. None of us chose to
pick a fight with trade or specific trade agreements. Rather, these pacts
included provisions that undermined the goals, values and policies on which we
had all long worked domestically and internationally from animal protection and
the environment to food safety and access to affordable medicines. The two
successful GATT and WTO attacks on animal protection laws laws
which the Humane Society was key in passing and
defending were the basis for your involvement in the Seattle WTO protests,
which you reference in your testimony. Of course Humane Society was prominent
in those protests: it was animal protection laws, not those regarding forests
or toxics, that had been the first victims of
retrograde trade agreement provisions.
I do not understand how the Humane Society would consider supporting an
agreement that reiterates the very trade rules that have been used successfully
to attack key animal protections. This is even more the case given the work
that your organization has undertaken to pressure for changes to these rules,
especially to the useless WTO-GATT Article XX animal and environmental policy
exceptions.
In the past you have rightly argued that the WTO-GATT Article XX exceptions
clause required a rewrite so that the provisions could be employed to safeguard
countries' legitimate animal laws when they otherwise might conflict with
WTO-GATT rules. You noted in your testimony that you had been given a seat at
the table by the United States Traded Representative (USTR). I would imagine
that you pushed to have the necessary changes to the WTO-GATT language on
exceptions made in the CAFTA.
There were many such reasonable requests made and rejected. For instance, many
of the free trade Democrats who had been among the minority of 21 Democrats who
supported Fast Track in 2001 had asked that USTR
simply maintain the labor standards now in effect under our current CBI trade
program with the CAFTA countries, rather than using the labor rights language
now included in CAFTA which would roll back the existing level of protection.
Clinton White House NAFTA czar Rahm Emmanuel, now a
congressman from Illinois,
asked that certain proposed provisions that would act to extend the length of
brand name drug patents be removed before the negotiations were completed. The
stubborn refusal by USTR to include any of these requests, despite how badly
the administration needed Democratic support for CAFTA, has led many supporters
of past trade agreements from NAFTA and WTO to the Singapore, Australia and
Morocco Free Trade Agreements - to oppose CAFTA. Perhaps ten Democrats would
vote for CAFTA were the President to gamble on bringing it to the House
floor.
Like these members of Congress, you must balance what you view as pros and cons
of CAFTA to determine your organizations position. Given your work in
these countries is a different matter than the potential implications of the
agreements provisions if implemented, I am interested to hear more about what
you consider the positive aspects, given the inclusion in CAFTA of these
WTO-GATT provisions which you have so rightly opposed in the past on the basis
of the turtle and dolphin cases certainly pose a significant negative.
CAFTA Would Make the Status Quo
Environmental, Animal Welfare Situation Worse
Regarding the actual CAFTA provisions which your testimony praised, it might be
worth considering how the Humane Society has come to such different conclusions
than every other environmental group that has analyzed the text. Certainly the
National Wildlife Federation and the World Wildlife Fund, who both supported
NAFTA, do not fall into the category of organizations that seem only to
criticize and complain that you referenced in your Senate testimony. That was
an unfair comment, as you know well that many in the environmental community
would love to have a trade agreement that they could support -- if only an
agreement would be negotiated that would even meet the do no further harm test.
But by any measure, from an environmental, animal welfare or health
perspective, CAFTA would make the status quo situation worse.
Even the Bush Administration's 2003 Environmental Review of CAFTA, which is
mainly a whitewash of CAFTA's most central
environmental and animal protection problems, admits that implementation of
CAFTA could result in the destruction of vital migratory bird habitats, raising
the question of the fate of other animals that rely on forest habitats. How
serious is this issue? Three out of four migratory bird routes in the Western Hemisphere pass through the CAFTA countries. Of
the 836 migratory bird species that are listed in the U.S. Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, some 350 neo-tropical migratory species (mainly songbirds) migrate
through or are winter residents of the CAFTA countries. And it was not the
Audubon Society, but the USTR in its Environmental Review, that noted that
CAFTA could contribute to the loss of migratory bird habitat through increased
investments in the agricultural sector linked to shifting from subsistence
farming to feed local residents to more intensive
export-oriented agriculture aimed at serving the U.S. market.
CAFTA Foreign Investor Protections
Extend NAFTA Chapter 11s Proved Threat to Environment
But what the Administrations Environmental Review did not include in its
analysis would seem to be more troubling for the Humane Society's interests.
For instance, CAFTAs Chapter 10 contains the foreign
investor protections and private investor-state enforcement mechanism found in NAFTAs Chapter 11. The problems many members of
Congress raised about such provisions in NAFTA (that they provide greater
rights to foreign investors operating in the United States than U.S. companies
and citizens are granted under the Constitution, including a right for
compensation for regulatory takings) have not been remedied in CAFTA, even
though the 2002 Fast Track instructed U.S. negotiators to do so. The Humane
Society was among the U.S.
organizations who rightly battled against
congressional proposals to establish a right of regulatory takings compensation
in federal legislation in the 1990s because it would have gutted the key
legislation used to protect animals, such as the Endangered
Species Act.
If CAFTA contained only the NAFTA regulatory takings provisions, which it does
with its NAFTA-clone language requiring compensation for indirect takings
, would that not alone be sufficient for the Humane Society to oppose
CAFTA? Those CAFTA provisions alone would extend the right to pursue regulatory
takings challenges of U.S.
environmental and land use regulations to the corporations of six more nations
and U.S.
corporate subsidiaries located in those nations . To
date there have been five successful corporate challenges of NAFTA countries
laws under NAFTAs Chapter 11 with $35 million in
taxpayer funds paid out to winning corporations. The U.S.
has spent over $3 million just defending one pending attack against a California environmental
law. Only one of the 42 cases filed, most of which are still being arbitrated,
resembled an actual expropriation of private land by the government (Mexico
sugar mills) against which these investor protections were ostensibly written
to protect.
Many of these cases are attacks on government regulatory action. In one case, a
U.S. company received compensation in a regulatory takings case after being
denied an operating permit for a toxic waste dump in an ecologically sensitive
zone in Mexico, even after it had purchased the facility from a Mexican firm
which had also been denied the same permit under a sale contract specifically
recognizing that the facility was a brownfield and
could not be operated until it was cleaned up. These NAFTA Chapter cases
certainly prove the Humane Societys foresight and
wisdom in opposing NAFTA. Yet, CAFTA would extend this same serious
problem.
If you raised this issue with USTR staff, they would note that they added some
language to CAFTAs Chapter 10 investor protection
rules relative to NAFTAs Chapter 11 which they argue
should remedy the problems. However, analysts from Professor Mathew Porterfield
at Georgetown Law School to the Association of U.S. State Supreme Court
Justices to the National Association of Attorneys General have all weighed in
on the failure of USTRs CAFTA language to remedy the
serious problems in NAFTAs investor protections,
especially as regards opening the United States to regulatory takings claims by
foreign corporations and U.S. subsidiaries operating in the CAFTA countries.
And, assorted free trade Democrats who were very eager to support CAFTA have
come out in opposition to CAFTA solely because of the threat that these
investor provisions pose to maintaining nondiscriminatory domestic zoning, land
use, environmental and health regulations.
Why have so many analysts inclined to support CAFTA concluded that USTRs changes to the investor protection language did not
remedy the serious problems? In some instances USTRs
language is simply meaningless, for instance CAFTA Article 10.11: Nothing in
this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining,
or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. (Emphasis added)
However, in some instances the USTR wordsmithing
added problems, as described next.
CAFTA Investor Protections Gutting of
Nuisance Law Threatens HSUS Factory Farming Efforts
One such example of new problems in the CAFTA foreign
investor protection language bears directly on Humane Societys
ability effectively to pursue its work against inhumane factory farming. One
tool you have used successfully is to engage local communities about the
environmental and health consequences of these inhumane farms, which treat
animals like expendable machines and pool their waste in noxious pools.
Yet, under CAFTAs investor rights language, vis-୶is investors from CAFTA countries or U.S. subsidiaries operating in those nations,
the U.S.
government would no longer be free to employ the long-established legal
principle that it is the right and duty of our governments to remedy a nuisance
without compensating a property owner. Nuisance is the legal term for any
toxic, dangerous, unhealthy or otherwise anti public interest activity or
situation. While the principle of polluter pays is not included in many U.S. laws, in
the instance of a nuisance, our federal, state and local governments can take
action typically to pass a regulation or issue a citation requiring a company
to eliminate the nuisance, for instance the source of noxious fumes generated
on its premises. Nuisance regulation has been one legal tactic that has been
used to limit the size of intensive stock operations and their huge waste
pools.
Unfortunately, the clause that USTR added to the CAFTA text which was
ostensibly aimed at fixing this accepted NAFTA investor protection problem in
fact does the opposite. The clause states directly that despite the longstanding
U.S.
nuisance jurisprudence, that there are instances when a country must compensate
for government actions taken or laws passed to end a health or welfare
hazard. Thus, our governments could be faced with CAFTA tribunals
ordering payments of our tax dollars for simply requiring that certain foreign
corporations meet our basic health, safety and humane laws. If implemented,
CAFTA could provide a tool to undermine HSUSs ability
to further its humane farming campaign and implement policies against intensive
livestock operations in the United
States.
CAFTA Foreign Investor Protections
Expand on NAFTA to Include Federal Natural Resource Concessions
In addition to the problems we know about from NAFTAs
investor protection provisions carried over into CAFTA, CAFTAs
foreign investment protection chapter includes several provisions that extend
beyond those in NAFTA. Given your organization is concerned about habitat and
also about fisheries, I wanted to bring your attention to one such addition. CAFTAs investment chapter adds several items to the list of
types of investmens that are covered by the
regulatory takings and other CAFTA investor protection provisions. One such new
item adds to the covered activities all contracts with the U.S. federal
government over natural resource concessions within federal territory. This
expanded definition of covered investment means that such natural resource
concession contracts are subject to CAFTAs investor
rules and the investor-state private enforcement system. Thus, foreign mining,
timber or other corporations who obtain U.S. government concessions would be
empowered to drag o
ur government into a CAFTA tribunal to demand payment
of our taxpayer dollars if they dont like the terms
and conditions of those contracts. As we all could foresee in the context
of the 1990s regulatory takings fights, the likely end result of such lawsuits
would be to weaken the environmental and other conditions for which the
government would otherwise have to compensate.
Thus, under current law, when a domestic or foreign company with a federal
natural resources concession believes that U.S. laws (for instance,
requirements to replant federal forest land it cut or to backfill a mining pit
on federal land) are unfair, the only recourse is to bring a case in U.S. court
where the best outcome a company could obtain is an injunction a court order to
stop what they think is unfair. In contrast, if CAFTA were to come into effect,
a foreign corporation including a subsidiary of a U.S. corporation would have
recourse to challenge that U.S. law as a violation of its CAFTA foreign
investor privileges which extend beyond U.S. property rights law, to do so in a
CAFTA investor-state tribunal and to demand payment of our tax dollars to make
up for having to follow the rule.
Again, we all know where that sort of legal strategy would lead over time to
the gutting of many important laws. This is why we all worked against the
domestic regulatory takings proposals in the 1990s. If that domestic threat
were not enough, imagine how these laws could be used against the Central
American countries to gut their existing environmental laws and thwart progress
perhaps even the initiatives of your own Central American branch or of its
local allies.
CAFTAs Service Sector Rules Bans on Quantitative
Limits and Elimination of EEZ Rights Pose Threats to Habitats and Fisheries
CAFTA contains a negative list services agreement, which means that CAFTAs Chapter 11s requirements cover all service sectors
unless an exception has been taken to remove a sector. The CAFTA service sector
rules apply not only to trade in services across borders, but also to who can
own and operate a service within a countrys
geographic territory (including a right for foreign service sector companies to
establish a commercial presence in another CAFTA country) and how and to
what degree such foreign-owned services may be regulated. The CAFTA service
sector rules forbid countries from maintaining or enacting certain limits on
market access for any sector that has not been listed as an
exclusion. These requirements are extraordinary, as they simply ban
certain types of policies unless a country listed them in their exceptions
lists, which some countries did for some sectors. Among the forbidden
limits are limits on the number of service suppliers, including through
quotas, monopolies, economic needs tests or exclusive service supplier
contracts; limits on the total number of service operations or the total
quantity of a service; and policies which restrict or require specific types of
legal entity (for instance a not-for-profit) or joint venture through which a
service suppliers may provide a service. These market access rules
are framed in absolute, rather than relative terms, pre-judging certain types of
public policies and practices whether they are discriminatory or not.
What does this mean practically for the Humane Societys
interests? Unless a CAFTA nation took an exception on a service sector, that
country is forbidden from limiting the number of service providers in that
sector. Thus, for instance, if a CAFTA government did not take an exception for
concessions in national parks, waste incinerators, oil drilling, or golf course
construction, it loses the right to limit the number of such businesses, even
if the limit applies equally to domestic and foreign service
providers. Many local anti-sprawl measures set limits on the number of hotels,
residences and resort facilities to minimize the development impact on the
environment and protect open space. Laws that seek to preserve marine habitat
by limiting oceanfront hotel construction would also run afoul of these rules.
Yet such laws are essential to preserving the habitat vital to the survival of
the CAFTA countries land and sea critters.
While we are on the subject of the ocean and its inhabitants, I also wanted to
make sure that you recognized another troubling aspect of CAFTA that affects
the Humane Societys interests in halting over-fishing
and protecting marine mammals. While the United
States took a very thorough, complete CAFTA reservation
for its 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), of the Central
American countries only Costa
Rica seems to have tried to take such a
complete reservation. However, unlike the United
States, Costa
Rica does not refer to it explicitly as an
EEZ. The Dominican Republic
and Honduras
took limited reservations which are far from maintaining their EEZ
rights. For Honduras,
the limited reservation prohibits foreign flag vessels only in territorial
waters (12 nautical miles), not its entire EEZ. For
the Dominican Republic,
the reservation prohibits foreign flag vessels for artisanal
fishing only out to 52 nautical miles. So basically, despite some limited reservatio
ns, they've given up their EEZ rights. I would imagine in your work in Central America, you have encountered the struggle many
developing countries face of trying to keep foreign factory fishing vessels out
of their EEZs. What is unclear with CAFTA is to what
extent countries could maintain any regulation on the terms of foreign ships
exploitation of fisheries within their EEZs.
CAFTAs Environmental Chapter Is a Warmed Over
Version of NAFTAs Failed Environmental Side Agreement
While your testimony omitted many critical problems with CAFTA that have led to
unanimous environmental group opposition, your testimony did discuss CAFTAs environmental chapter. I am assuming that one reason
you praise CAFTAs environmental provisions is because
they are contained in a chapter of the actual agreement text rather than being
in the form of a side agreement a la NAFTA. I will describe why I have a
different analysis of the merits of what is in that CAFTA chapter. But there is
something quite important that is in NAFTA that is not in CAFTAs
environmental chapter or anywhere else in CAFTAs
text. NAFTAs core text (not its side agreement)
contains a provision (Article 104 Relation to Environmental and Conservation
Agreements) that explicitly states that: In the event of any inconsistency
between this Agreement and the specific trade obligations set out in CITES, the
Montreal Protocol and the Basel Convention and several bilateral border
environmental treati
es such obligations (the environmental treaties)
shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency. (insert
added)
This clause in NAFTA continues on with some limiting conditions which have
concerned some legal scholars regarding how effectively it would actually be in
application. However, it certainly was a step in the right direction to state
the principle that multilateral environmental agreement provisions should trump
NAFTAs commercial provisions. This is the case
because under the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties, the
obligations of a treaty that comes later in time trump
those of pre-existing to the extent of conflict unless a signatory country
inserts a savings clause in the newer treaty. CAFTA fails to include even the
modest clause included in NAFTA or any savings clause that gives precedence to
environmental treaties if their provisions conflict with CAFTAs
commercial requirements. Given many such treaties, such as CITES, about which
Humane Society deeply cares, are enforced in part by banning trade in certain
goods, there are clear conflicts between tra
de agreements and the trade provisions in MEAs, a
topic which was subject to much discussion at the WTO, although those talks
ended in deadlock.
Regarding the laudatory description your testimony gives to CAFTAs
environmental chapter, I do not know how to say this more diplomatically, but whomever wrote your testimony made some critical errors.
Lets go through the first paragraph:
CAFTAs Environmental Chapter 17 simply is not more
complete than in previous free trade agreements. Indeed, NAFTAs
environmental agreement is three times as long and contains a variety of
binding commitments regarding each countries establishment and enforcement of
environmental law not found in CAFTA. Yet, eleven years after its
implementation, NAFTAs side agreement is viewed
unanimously in the environmental community has having been a failure.
For the provisions it does include, CAFTAs
environmental agreement unfortunately largely contains word-for-word replicas
of some of the provisions found in NAFTAs failed
environmental side agreement, including the enforcement provisions.
You cite as the highlights of CAFTAs environmental
obligations the requirements that countries strive to improve environmental
laws and effectively enforce their domestic environmental laws.
You put great emphasis on the importance of the word strive in your testimony.
My understanding of that word is the opposite of the meaning given to it in
your testimony. The clause shall strive to improve is a classic legal
construction lawyers are taught to use to make the underlying commitment
unenforceable. As long as a country can show it is striving it is not required
to actually improve the obligation is to strive not to improve. That same
language exists in NAFTA and has proven useless.
Meanwhile, in your testimony, you actually mistakenly cite the NAFTA standard
of environmental law enforcement, not the CAFTA standard. Under NAFTA, a
government can ask for an arbitral panel in cases when there has been a
persistent pattern of failure by that other Party to effectively enforce its
environmental law. The CAFTA standard is stated in the negative, is yet
more attenuated and requires a proving that environmental nonenforcement
affects trade (which NAFTA did not). Both CAFTA and NAFTAs
standard do require an undefined pattern (NAFTA) or sustained or recurring
course (CAFTA) of failure to enforce. As was discussed at length during the
NAFTA debate, the lack of definition provides enormous discretion for tribunals
to dismiss cases for not having risen to the level of non-defined repetition
required.
Moreover, what CAFTA and NAFTA unfortunately have in common is an escape clause
to the enforce your own laws standard that eviscerates the standard and would
do so even if the standard were written in a manner that makes it easier to
prove. In CAFTA, the relevant text states: (a) A Party shall not fail to
effectively enforce its environmental laws through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties(b) the Parties understand that a Party is in
compliance with subparagraph (a) where a course of action or inaction reflects
a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision
regarding allocation of resources. It is hard to imagine what failure to
enforce a countrys domestic environmental laws could
not explained away as being based on a bona fide decision regarding allocation
of resources.
Given that this standard would make it very hard to find any actionable nonenforcement, discussing the enforcement system seems almost
besides the point. However, your testimony lauded CAFTAs environmental chapters
enforcement mechanism as especially effective. Yet the environmental
enforcement system in CAFTA is what was also contained in NAFTA, except with a
lower fine. In CAFTA, assuming one could prove a violation under that standard,
the sanction is a fine capped at $15 million, which is paid from the government
back to the government. You note in your testimony that this is a substantial
amount for a developing country. First, recall that in NAFTA, failure to
enforce could face a fine up to $20 million. But also, I do not
understand how a fine that is not paid away but rather is transferred from one
government account to another government account is substantial.
The scenario that worries many is that a country will simply pay some of its
existing environmental budget into a fine account as required in the CAFTA
text, meaning that the fine will neither increase net environmental spending
nor serve as an incentive to change conduct. Meanwhile, violations of CAFTAs commercial provisions result in trade sanctions
which are not capped at any set level. In contrast to transferring a set amount
between government accounts, having a countrys
exports hit with high tariffs is motivating of policy change, as we have seen
time and again in the WTO context. Yet despite a broad demand from the free
trade Democrats for parity in enforcement for CAFTAs
commercial clauses relative to its environmental and labor rules, this double
standard was employed.
Finally, I also wanted to raise your focus on and praise for the public
submission process in CAFTA. The very same process public submissions to an
independent commission which can result in nothing more than the writing up of
a factual record that is published - was included in NAFTA. This is not
something new in CAFTA. And sadly, the process in NAFTA has never resulted in
improved environmental conditions.
On several occasions, NAFTAs Council on Environmental
Cooperation (CEC) factual records have been published,
but typically after the fact. For instance, the reef-killing cruise ship dock
was built in the Yucatan
before the CEC report on the matter was ever published, even though Mexican
environmental groups had filed through the citizen submission process well
before construction began. And this public submission/factual record generation
process has not once resulted in changed conduct by the governments. Indeed,
after a flurry of citizen submissions filings in NAFTAs
first five years, few even bother to file cases. The process has been roundly
criticized by the NAFTA CECs own public advisory
committee. For instance, Gustavo Alanis-Ortega, who
chaired the JPAC in 2003, complained to reporters that Citizens are never asked
their opinions once theyve submitted petitions even
though a governments take on an issue is actively
solicited. [] It can take more than three ye
ars to finish a report.
All that the CAFTA public submission process would allow is for the Humane
Society to ask for an official report about a problem. Given the well
documented record after 11 years of the same system not operating effectively
under NAFTA, I do not understand your statement that development of a factual
record is important and in my opinion has teeth because no country would relish
the possibility of having such a record developed on its behavior. In fact,
while countries perhaps have not enjoyed having these factual records
published, the process has proved to have no teeth in that it has not once
resulted in changes in government conduct.
Finally, to close regarding your comments about CAFTAs
environmental agreement, I refer you back a few paragraphs in my letter to the
discussion of CAFTA not including the savings clause present in NAFTA Article
104 that gives precedence to CITES and the other MEAs.
In your testimony, you state that because the Central American countries have
adopted CITES, it is now their domestic law and thus subject to the enforce your own law standard of the NAFTA.
I believe this analysis misses a key point: even if you disagree with my
analysis of why CAFTAs environmental chapter does not
provide for effective action against nonenforcement
of environmental measures, enforcement of environmental obligations clearly can
result in a trade challenge under CAFTAs commercial
obligations. For instance, a CAFTA nations implementation of CITES which
inherently includes some trade measures could violate CAFTAs
commercial obligations and thus result in a challenge in CAFTAs
binding commercial tribunals where violating laws must be changed or the
country faces trade sanctions.
Recall that this is precisely what happened to the United
States with the WTO turtle-shrimp case, a challenge where
CAFTA countries El Salvador
and Guatemala made third
party submissions against the U.S.
law. U.S.
implementation of its CITES obligations is done
through the U.S. Endangered Species Act. The WTO panel ruled that the
Endangered Species Act regulations that the United States used to put into
effect CITES protections for listed sea turtles violated U.S. WTO trade
obligations.
You might argue that the CAFTA target countries could go to WTO to make such an
attack on each others laws, so that this is also possible in CAFTA is not
relevant. However, CAFTA was the opportunity to remedy that threat as between
the involved countries -- by not inserting into CAFTA the same WTO-GATT
language, by providing a meaningful exceptions clause instead of the GATT
Article XX language and by including a savings clause for MEAs.
The Humane Society and many other organizations have worked for over a decade
to try to change the WTO-GATT rules in this regard with no success, in part
because so many countries would have to agree. The Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
would be the venue for trying to change the model. The FTAs, including CAFTA,
are being used by every other interest to accomplish what they cannot at WTO.
Yet again, reasonable requests simply to include provisions that could hold
harmless from challenge environmental and for animal protection policies have
been
rejected regarding CAFTA.
I have been trying for nearly a year and a half to get an appointment to meet
with you to discuss assorted trade matters. I hope we might meet soon. In
addition to these important CAFTA issues, there remain several medium term
issues I am eager to discuss: a worrisome change in the Harmonized Tariff
System that adds cetacean meat to a previous customs classification that only
previously covered live marine mammals (aquarium trade e.g.) which perhaps is
connected to the attack on the whaling ban and issues related to endangered
species trade vis-୶is the proposed
U.S.-Thailand Free Trade Agreement. I hope to meet with you soon.
Yours Sincerely,
Lori Wallach
Director, Public Citizens Global Trade
Watch